The Continued Threat of al-Shabaab in Mogadishu

On 19 July, 2012 unidentified gunmen assassinated Maxamed Ali Hussein, the Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Finance of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu as he returned from evening prayers at a local mosque.

With the both the identities and motives of the assassins unknown, speculation is likely to fall on members of the Islamist movement al-Shabaab and its supporters who remained in Mogadishu following the al-Shabaab retreat from Mogadishu in August 2011.

While the obvious suspicion for this attack may fall upon the group, al-Shabaab has in fact denied responsibility, instead placing responsibility on persons within the TFG due to the issue of corruption. Despite the source of this theory, there may indeed actually be some evidence to give it support with reports that Mr Hussein may have been interviewed by the United Nations Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group (link in Somali) whose leaked report has raised serious allegations of corruption among TFG officials.

“Hit Squads”

While responsibility for this slaying may never be properly attributed, it is nonetheless an important reminder of the fragility of the security situation in Mogadishu and the continued threat posed by al-Shabaab. Following the announcement of the formation of “hit squads” in all 16 Districts of Mogadishu (link Somali) the group has made continuous attempts to kill officials and soldiers loyal to the TFG as well as maintain a psychological, if not physical grip over the city.

Indeed, despite its fighters having been driven from their positions both in and around the capital by the forces of TFG and its African Union mission in Somalia AMISOM, al-Shabaab has been able to demonstrate its ability to successfully carry-out attacks against high-level targets in Mogadishu such as the recent of the former TFG Minister of Commerce and former official of the Islamic Courts Union, Mohamud Abdi Garwayne by means of a car bomb in the Hamarweyne District of Mogadishu.

Al-Shabaab’s Mogadishu Campaign in 2012

Whether or not al-Shabaab or its supporters are ever definitively linked to the murder of Maxahmed Ali Hussein the evidence suggests that in 2012, at least thus far, the group remains a lethal threat to high-level persons within the TFG. The following attacks are indeed evidence of this:

March 19, 2012

The presidential compound in Mogadishu, Villa Somalia, comes under mortar fire. Dozens of rounds are fired in the first such attack since al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu in August 2011.

April 4, 2012

A female suicide bomber targets the TFG Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali and other government ministers at the National Theatre in Mogadishu during a ceremony to celebrate the first anniversary of the launch of the government’s satellite television station. The attack killed 8 persons including the President of the Somali Olympic Committee, Aden Yabarow Wiish, Somali Football Federation chief, Said Mohamed Nur, Others died later of their wounds and included Parliamentarian Mowlid Ma'aney Mohamud and Faisal Haji Elmi, an advisor to Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali.

May 29, 2012

The convoy of TFG President Sharif Ahmed is ambushed by al-Shabaab fighters as it was returning to Mogadishu after a vist to the recently captured town of Afgoye. The President was uninjured in the attack.

June 16, 2012

A suicide car bombing organised by al-Shabaab strikes at a military base in Afgoye killing 2 TFG soldiers and wounding 3 civilians.

June 22, 2012

An ambush by al-Shabaab fighters of a military convoy on the Elasha Biyaha neighbourhood of Mogadishu kills the Afrah Ali Farah, the local police chief for the neighbourhood.

Other incidents such as the premature detonation of a massive car bomb outside of a police department building on 17 February, multiple bombings in on May 19 and the constant attempts to assassinate TFG security and intelligence officer are likewise evidence of the strength and resilience of the al-Shabaab network in Mogadishu.

 However, despite the significance of each of the above attacks, they nevertheless represent only a small percentage of the number of attacks both carried out and attempted in Mogadishu for which al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility. Other attacks on TFG officials and security force members continue to be attributed to “unidentified gunmen” although it is highly likely al-Shabaab remains responsible for most, if not almost all of these.

The Decline of al-Shabaab?

The capacity of al-Shabaab to maintain the ability to carry-out such attacks may however diminish over time as the group suffers both tactical and strategic defeats on the battlefield elsewhere in Somalia. It is certainly possible the loss of taxation revenue, both in-kind (food, clothing etc) and money, as well as battlefield losses of skilled leaders and personnel may have a negative effect on its continued ability to plan, prepare and stage attacks in the capital.  Nevertheless, so long as al-Shabaab is able to maintain a sufficient presence in Mogadishu of both fighters and sympathisers it is likely that we will continue to see attacks take place, albeit with an overall decline in scale and effectiveness.